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Abstract.  A project to enable health care professionals (GPs, practice nurses and
diabetes nurse specialists) to access, via the Internet, confidential patient data held on a
secondary care (hospital) diabetes information system, has been implemented. We
describe the application that we chose to distribute (a diabetes register); the security
mechanisms we used to protect the data (a public key infrastructure with strong
encryption and digitally signed messages, plus a firewall); the reasons for the
implementation decisions we made; the validation testing that we performed and the
preliminary results of the pilot implementation.
1. Introduction
The effective management of chronic disease, such as diabetes and cardiovascular
disease, are increasingly dependent upon information technology. Traditionally these
information systems have been developed within secondary care (hospitals), and have
only been accessible from within the home institution. Many dozens (if not hundreds)
of these information systems exits at hospitals around the UK. Unfortunately the
majority of care is provided by primary care (GP’s) and nurses, who do not have easy,
real time access to the information recorded in these centralised hospital information
systems. This can result in inefficient health care provision e.g. duplication of
investigations.
The aim of this research was to develop a methodology to convert standalone, hospital
based information systems, into highly secure distributed applications running on the
Internet. This would enable geographically dispersed health care professionals to have
access to the information held within the (previously centralised) information system.
After some discussions with the clinicians at our local hospital, Hope Hospital in
Salford, Greater Manchester, it was decided that their Diabetic Information System
(DIS) would be a useful application from which to build and test our methodology.
2. The Centralised Application
Salford is a health care district in Greater Manchester, UK, with a population of 230,510
of whom 5395 are known to have diabetes. The DIS was introduced in January 1992,
and holds details about all the known diabetes patients. The DIS is used by all primary
care and hospital diabetes services. Records based upon the UK Diabetes dataset [9]
are updated and verified during the annual structured preventative care review. Briefly
this contains information regarding their type of diabetes, how it is treated, the
presence of any diabetes related complications and biochemical indicators used to
assess metabolic control.
The DIS is accessible directly via a built-in user interface, and very recently a SQL
based fat client has been added to allow access via the hospital LAN. (The client is
fat, as it performs authorisation decisions based on the user’s login identity. By
comparison a thin client would let the database perform the authorisation function.)
All clinicians are given a username/password pair for login to the application, the
username determines his privileges for accessing the data (i.e. hospital consultants and
general practitioners can only access data relating to their own patients). As the
hospital LAN is a trusted network, with no network connections to the outside world,
no security is provided for the data whilst it is in transit between the client and server.
Once a year, paper printouts of each patient are produced and posted to all local GPs
who then call the patients in for an annual diabetes examination. The completed pro-
formas are posted back to the hospital for manual entry into the DIS, a process that
can take several weeks (or months) to complete and produces additional problems.
Data are double entered, once onto the pro-forma and once into the database, thus
giving rise to potential transcription errors. If patients visit their GP before their
annual check up, no up-to-date data is available. The pro-formas can, and do, get lost
or misplaced, and the whole process is time consuming.
3. Issues in Distributing the Application
To make the application accessible over the Internet, a number of security and
usability concerns were addressed. Most importantly we had to ensure the
confidentiality of all patient data during transfer and ensure that only appropriate
health care professionals could access the data as clinicians have a legal duty of care
to ensure that patient details are kept confidential. This could not be compromised
whilst the data is in transit over the Internet and so it calls for strong encryption.
Secondly, the hospital DIS must be assured that the remote user is genuinely who they
say they are, so that unauthorised people are not allowed to access the patient data.
This calls for strong authentication of the users. Thirdly the privacy of the hospital
LAN must be maintained by keeping out undesirable users and only letting in bona-
fide users. This requires a firewall to protect the gateway between the hospital LAN
and the Internet. Finally the user interface must be simple to use, quick to learn, and
fast in performance, since health care professionals are extremely busy with very
limited time to spend on learning new applications or waiting for data to arrive whilst
in consultation with patients.
The first two concerns we addressed using a public key infrastructure (PKI), with
strong encryption and digital signatures. These would provide both the confidentiality
and the strong authentication that a health care application needs. We were already
using an Entrust [7] PKI for other research projects and so it was natural to choose
this, but if we had not had access to Entrust, there are a number of other commercial
PKI vendors and CA service providers to choose from. The hospital chose to use
FireWall-1 from Checkpoint [8] in order to adequately address the third concern about
privacy of the hospital LAN.
In order to address the fourth point we had the choice between building a special
purpose user friendly interface, or using an existing well known user friendly interface
such as a Web browser. A special purpose interface gives the most flexibility in terms
of design and capability, but at the cost of significant development effort plus time
invested by the user to learn how to use the new application. The World Wide Web on
the other hand is ubiquitous, and most (if not all) computer users already know how to
use one of the popular browsers. With their simple click and point interfaces we felt
that browsers would give us the most chance of success with primary carers, since the
latter probably already know how to use browsers, and if not, it should not take much
time to teach them. Furthermore minimal development effort would be needed for
this, as we could design the main web page to look like the paper form that the
clinicians were used to seeing. The architecture is shown in Figure 1.
Given this decision, a number of other decisions flowed from it. Firstly, we had to
decide how to convert the http requests once they arrived at the web server, into SQL
requests for access to the DIS. Secondly, we had to decide between using SSL[3]
protocol and its X.509[2] certificates, or Entrust formatted X.509 certificates and their
proprietary protocol. We decided to use CGI scripts to solve the former problem, as
they are an already proven way of converting web traffic into application specific
queries.
The latter decision was somewhat more difficult to make. SSL has a number of
benefits, namely: it is a de-facto standard, all web servers and clients support it, and
all PKI vendors and service providers can issue certificates in this format. However,
SSL as implemented in 1998, had a number of severe disadvantages:
- we only had immediate access to 40 bit encryption, which was inadequate
for confidential patient data. We managed to get plugins o Netscape
Communicator for 128 bit encryption (from Fortify [1]), but not for
Microsoft Internet Explorer (these would require a US export licence).
- SSL browsers and servers did not support the automatic retrieval of
certificate revocation lists (CRLs), and this is an important factor to
consider, especially from the server side.
- Trust management has to be performed by the users of the browsers and
the administrator of the web server. By this we mean that deciding which
root CA public keys to trust and which not to trust has to be performed by
the users. As these people are typically not security specialists (and
additionally in the case of GPs they simply don’t have time to do this) we
thought that this placed too much burden on them. It is a role that should
be carried out by the security officers of the organisations.
- Certificate renewal after expiry is a manual process, and some browsers
will still continue to use expired certificates.
Entrust Direct on the other hand, acts as proxies for both web clients and servers. Http
requests from standard web clients are intercepted by the Entrust Direct client proxy
running in the user’s machine, strongly encrypted and digitally signed using the user’s
private key, before being sent to the web server. The Entrust Direct server proxy,
Figure 1. The Chosen Architecture















running in the hospital firewall, intercepts the traffic for the web server, decrypts it,
verifies the signature, and, if the user is trusted, forwards the http request to the web
server. Both the Entrust Direct client and server automatically retrieve CRLs and
process them, they will not accept expired certificates. They also have automatic
mechanisms for certificate renewal (without user involvement) and they have all their
trust decisions made for them by the security administrator of the PKI. Whilst a
Canadian export permit was required for using 128 bit encryption, this was merely a
formality as Entrust had already been granted blanket approval for the UK. (Since
1998 of course, the export situation has changed somewhat, in that the US has now
altered its approach and has granted blanket approval for 128 bit encryption to be
exported to commercial organisations in approximately 45 countries.) Given the
above advantages of Entrust Direct, especially with the security naïve set of busy
users that we had, it became the natural choice for us.
4. Implementation
In order to operate a PKI, a number of components are needed. The Certification
Authority (CA) is the central server that responds to certification requests from the
user, and signs the certificates of the users. It also issues the revocation lists. The CA
will not issue new certificates or add certificates to revocation lists without being
asked to do so by an authorised party. Usually a signed message from a trusted
Registration Authority (RA) is sufficient for this. The Registration Authority Agent
(RAA) is the administrative client used by a RA to issue signed certification or
revocation requests to the CA. In the case of Entrust, after receiving a valid
certification request from the RA, the CA returns secret authorisation information to
the RA, which the RA gives to the user after authenticating him/her. The user’s Client
uses the secret information to establish an authenticated encrypted link with the CA,
and then sends a certification request to the CA. The possession of this secret
information by the user proves to the CA that the user has been authenticated by the
RA, and the CA is therefore willing to issue the user certificate. All of the above are
provided by Entrust as part of their basic PKI product line. All communications
between the CA server and the other PKI entities are secured, but as a further
precaution, we placed a Linux IPFWADM firewall between our CA server and the
Internet, in order to block any improper traffic from untrusted third parties.
One additional component needed by a PKI is a directory service in which to publish
the certificates and CRLs that have been issued by the CA. LDAP [4] is the Internet
standard protocol for accessing directory services, and this protocol is used by the CA
server to write to the directory, and by clients to retrieve certificates and CRLs from
it. We used the directory server from MessagingDirect [6] to publish our certificates
and CRLs.
The final components of our PKI are the Entrust Direct proxies that intercept the http
traffic between the clinicians and the DIS. As stated previously, they interact with the
PKI to fetch CRLs and check the signatures of incoming messages. They also
digitally sign all outgoing messages. In the case of the client proxy it uses the private
key of the clinician; in the case of the server proxy it uses the private key allocated to
the DIS. The mode of operation is that the clinician starts the Entrust Direct client
proxy instead of his usual browser, enters his password to gain access to his private
key, and then the proxy starts up the browser. The user then interacts with the Web
browser in the normal way, with no visible further interference from the client proxy.
At the server end, the administrator of the firewall must enter the password protecting
the DIS’s private key every time the server proxy is started. Thus every interaction
with the DIS is digitally signed and may be audited if required.
Whilst the PKI provides the strong authentication function, our CGI scripts needed to
provide the authorisation function. The privileges must be administered in exactly the
same way as the SQL fat client that they replace. The SQL client administered
privileges by holding a table in the DIS containing the username, password and
permissions of each registered user. The SQL client had super-user privileges to the
DIS, and when a user logged in, it would compare the password with that stored in the
DIS, and if correct, would retrieve the appropriate permissions for the user and act
accordingly. We built the same functionality into our CGI scripts, but with an added
enhancement. The first time a user accessed the DIS, he had to provide his DIS
username and password. The CGI script checked that these were correct, and then
stored the LDAP distinguished name of the user (obtained from the digital signature)
in a new field in the DIS’s table. On subsequent login attempts, the CGI script could
simply retrieve the clinician’s registered username by looking up the one equivalent to
the LDAP DN in the table.
The biggest problem we had to overcome was how to store the DIS super-user name
and password securely. As each CGI script needs access to these, we could not expect
the firewall administrator to have to type them in each time. Therefore we had to rely
on obscurity rather than security, and hide the username and password somewhere
where the scripts could find them (details withheld for obvious reasons!). A future



























MS IIS + CGI scripts
Figure 2 System Components
sits between the CGI scripts and the DIS. This will have to have the super-user name
and password entered at start up time by the firewall administrator.
The complete system with all its components is shown in Figure 2.
5. Validation Testing
Once the system was built, members of the project team and closely associated
colleagues in the university and hospital (7 testers in all) performed a series of
validation tests on the system. These were carried out prior to the implementation
with the GP pilot users, as we wanted to be sure that the system was user friendly,
reliable, and fast enough in performance before we gave it to busy GPs in their
working environment. Each database access test lasted between twenty and thirty
minutes, to simulate what a clinician in the field would probably do under normal
clinical situations. The following areas were examined under timed conditions:
· Logging onto the Application securely
· Searching for a patient’s record and retrieving the details (4 times per
testing session)
· Updating one patient’s data with new information and retrieving it
· Closing the Application down and logging off
· Attempting to log on in an insecure manner (for performance
comparison purposes)
In addition we logged the availability of the underlying hardware, software and
networking infrastructure throughout the testing period. We measured the network
availability by issuing Pings at timed intervals to various stations on the university
LAN, the university’s Internet gateway, University College London (a well known
reliable site on the Internet), Demon Internet (to test LINX connectivity for dialup
users), the hospital gateway, and the hospital’s LAN. We measured data integrity by
asking the testers to Email a copy of their retrieved record to a researcher, who
compared this bit-wise with a copy he had previously downloaded from the diabetic
register. Finally we measured the time it took to install each user with the Entrust PKI.
We revoked one user to see if this worked satisfactorily, and we reinstalled another
user who pretended to forget his password to his private key.
5.1. Test Results
We decided that 15 minutes was a reasonable time in which to install a new user with
the client components of the Entrust PKI system. Out of the 8 users who volunteered
to perform the tests, 1 was already installed prior to the testing, but we only managed
to install 3 of the remaining 7 users within the allotted 15 minutes. 3 more were
successfully installed within 24 hours of starting the installation, but we could not
install the final user due to her PC’s limited capabilities and the interactions with her
Internet Service Provider (which limited outgoing TCP/IP connections). Clearly client
installation is not as straightforward as it should be, even given that we were working
in a very heterogeneous environment of PCs (different memories, CPUs,
manufacturers, operating systems, configurations etc.).
The 7 installed users completed 32 series of tests. This was less than we had planned,
but never the less we felt it was sufficient to perform a meaningful analysis of the
results.
The system proved to be very reliable throughout the testing period, with most
components scoring 100% availability. Only the Entrust Direct server was temporarily
unreliable, at 66% availability (it crashed at 4pm every day). When we changed the
frequency of CRL publication from 4 hours to 24 hours, the problem disappeared.
Network availability, at 93%, was also poor, but unfortunately this was out of our
control. The poor performance was almost entirely accounted for by failures in the
University of Salford LAN, and not in the Internet.
We were particularly encouraged by the time taken to learn to use the system (less
than 8 minutes) plus the performance once the application was installed and the
connection made to the database (between 2 and 32 seconds to search for and retrieve
a patient record). However, the time taken to launch the application and make the
connection to the database (up to 2 minutes) was longer than we would have hoped
for. Certainly we felt that this time would be prohibitive for a GP during a patient
consultation.
Data integrity measured 99% and not 100% as expected. However, the 1% failure was
found to be due to a documented bug in Windows NT. Of the 72 sets of results
received from the testers, all were identical except for one where the dates were in
American format rather than European format. A workaround has since been applied
to the application.
User revocation and user re-installation both worked correctly with no hi kups.
Our overall conclusions from the validation testing were that the application was easy
to use, performed well after launching, but that application installation is
problematical and application launching is too time consuming.
6. Piloting with the Users
At the time of writing the piloting has not completed, although installation has
completed and the piloting is over half way through. The results of the installation
saw a repeat of the difficulties that we found during the validation testing, only this
time the environments were even more heterogeneous, with a combination of different
PCs, some connected by LANs and some stand alone, using a variety of different
ISPs. Consequently we experienced an even greater number of unforeseen technical
problems during installation.
The original plan was to pilot the application with 12 doctors and practice nurses
located in 4 different surgeries. Surgery A is split over 2 physical locations and has 2
GPs and a practice nurse that work in both locations. Surgery B has 4 GPs and 2
practice nurses (but only 1 of the latter agreed to participate in the pilot). Surgery C
has 1 GP and 1 practice nurse, and surgery D has a diabetic specialist in a tertiary care
unit.
Surgery A had no suitable PC at either location, and so the project lent them a suitably
configured PC and modem. This was placed in one of their locations on a worktop
away from the GPs desks, and so was not readily accessible during consultations.
Installation proved difficult due to the fact that their ISP, one of the numerous free
ones in the UK, demanded to know the calling telephone number before giving them
complete Internet access (i.e. access to all protocols and port numbers. We were using
non-standard ports for our LDAP service, and Entrust uses non-standard protocols and
ports). As most GPs are ex-directory, they usually withhold their telephone number
from outgoing calls. We had to try 10 different free ISPs before we found one that did
not demand to know the calling number during login. Halfway through the trial our
logging indicated that this surgery had not used the system once. When queried about
this they admitted that they needed the PC to be on a mobile trolley rather than on a
worktop, so that it could be moved to where the GPs were working. They would also
like to have a printer available to them so that they could print out the patient’s
details. These were provided for the second half of the trial.
Surgery B has a LAN installed, with PCs on every GPs desk and a central server
which automatically dials the Internet when needed. Though this dialup can take a
minute to connect, it means that the Internet is always there when needed and no
explicit action is needed on the part of the GPs. However, despite making several
visits to the surgery, after one month we had only installed the software with 2 GPs
and the practice nurse. The problems were all of a technical nature, but were
compounded by the limited time available to the GPs. Therefore if the installation did
not proceed as planned within the allotted time we usually had to book another
appointment. Problems arose from the LAN configuration, and this made installation
difficult. One of the GPs had volunteered to use a smart card to hold his private key,
but after an hour of trying to install the card and reader he decided to use software
based keys instead. (A report of some of the difficulties we experienced with smart
cards is given in [5].) However, after installation our log files showed that they were
using the system.
In surgery C the GP uses the Internet frequently, and we were specifically asked not
to alter any of his Internet settings. However, the GP was using an ISP provided
dialer, rather than Windows Dial-Up Networking, and this forced the web browser to
use that ISPs default proxy settings. These settings stopped Entrust/Direct from
working. Fortunately the GP did have another ISP already installed, and so we had to
instruct him to use that ISP, but even this caused him some disruption. The GP also
agreed to pilot the use of a smart card, and this increased the installation time to 1.5
hours. However he had problems subsequently when using the smart card, and
eventually reverted to using software based keys.
Surgery D had no suitable PC, and so the project lent the specialist a laptop and a
modem and set her up with an ISP. She was only able to dial the ISP from one of her
3 consulting rooms as (a) the telephone connection in one room barred external calls
starting with a zero and (b) the telephone connection in another room had a broken
dialling tone which the modem did not recognise (we had to dial the “9” for an
outside line manually to get a normal dialling tone!). However, once installed, this
user uses the application very frequently from the third consulting room (several times
a day in fact).
7. Conclusions
We have shown that it is possible to provide highly secure remote access to a hospital
information system via the Internet, using commercial products and tailor made CGI
scripts. By using a web browser interface the system is extremely easy to learn to use
by both doctors, specialists and practice nurses. The response time is also adequate.
However the time taken to the launch the application is an inhibiting factor, especially
when using dial-up access via an ISP. The largest problem we faced was installing the
users as members of the public key infrastructure. Installation was plagued with
unforeseen technical difficulties, and the smart cards proved so time consuming to
install and problematical to use that all our users stopped using them during the trials.
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